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Nonlocality and contextuality are at the root of conceptual puzzles in quantum mechanics, and are
key resources for quantum advantage in information-processing tasks. Bell nonlocality is best un-
derstood as the incompatibility between quantum correlations and the classical theory of causality,
applied to relativistic causal structure. Contextuality, on the other hand, is on a more controversial
foundation. In this work, I provide a common conceptual ground between nonlocality and contextu-
ality as violations of classical causality. First, I show that Bell inequalities can be derived solely from
the assumptions of no-signalling and no-fine-tuning of the causal model. This removes two extra
assumptions from a recent result from Wood and Spekkens, and remarkably, does not require any
assumption related to independence of measurement settings – unlike all other derivations of Bell
inequalities. I then introduce a formalism to represent contextuality scenarios within causal mod-
els and show that all classical causal models for violations of a Kochen-Specker inequality require
fine-tuning. Thus the quantum violation of classical causality goes beyond the case of space-like
separated systems, and manifests already in scenarios involving single systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum contextuality, the phenomenon uncovered by
Kochen and Specker (KS) [1], is at the core of the quan-
tum departure from classicality, and has recently been
identified as a candidate for the resource behind the
power of quantum computation [2]. Much controversy
still exists, however, on what exactly contextuality is,
with different formalisms giving different definitions of
the phenomenon [3–6]. For example, derivations follow-
ing the work of Kochen-Specker require an assumption of
outcome determinism, the validity of which in experimen-
tally relevant situations has been criticised [3, 7]. Indeed,
it has been argued that it is not possible to experimen-
tally test contextuality without extra assumptions [8].
Bell nonlocality [9] rests on comparatively solid foun-
dations. It is best understood as the incompatibility be-
tween quantum correlations and causal constraints [10].
A modern approach is to capture these constraints within
the framework of causal networks [11], where causal
structure is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
(Fig. 1). Assuming a causal graph motivated by rela-
tivity (Fig. 2), we can derive constraints on observable
probability distributions – the Bell inequalities. A viola-
tion of a Bell inequality thus implies either a violation of
relativistic causality, or of one or more of the assump-
tions underlying this framework for causality, such as
Reichenbach’s principle of common cause [12, 13]. This
second alternative has motivated a programme to extend
the classical causal formalism to a framework of quantum
causal models [13–18], opening the exciting prospect of
a coherent understanding of the nature of causality in a
quantum world, and a resolution of at least part of the
puzzle of Bell’s theorem [19].
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Contextuality, on the other hand, is a priori unrelated
to causality: it is not necessary that measurements are
space-like separated, or that they involve separate sub-
systems at all. Thus it is not clear how a theory of
quantum causality could help with contextuality. Here
I bridge that gap and show that all classical causal mod-
els that reproduce the violation of Bell and KS inequal-
ities violate a core principle of the causal models frame-
work: no-fine-tuning. This unifies Bell-nonlocality and
KS-contextuality as violations of classical causality, and
opens a new direction for the study of contextuality as a
resource.
In an influential work [20], Wood and Spekkens showed
that every classical causal model that can reproduce Bell
inequality violations requires causal connections not ob-
served in the phenomena, such as faster-than-light cau-
sation. Only with special, finely tuned, parameters can
a causal model “hide” those connections from observers.
This provides a novel way of looking at Bell inequalities –
not as implications of relativistic causal structure, but as
implications of classical causal principles for any causal
structure. That result, however, applied only to phe-
nomena satisfying two extra assumptions, which makes
it inapplicable to contextuality scenarios. Here I prove a
more general result without those extra conditions, and
show how it can be extended to the case of contextuality.
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Fig. 1: In a directed acyclic graph (DAG) (left), nodes
represent random variables and directed edges represent
causal links. Closed cycles (right) are excluded.
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2This work is organised as follows. In Section II I re-
view the framework of causal models, and how it can be
used to derive Bell inequalities by assuming free choice
and relativistic causality. In Section III I introduce a
formalism for describing contextuality scenarios within
classical causal models, and present the main results. In
Section IV I illustrate the need for fine-tuning in causal
models for violations of Kochen-Specker inequalities with
an example. In Section V I discuss the relation between
the present result and the previous work of [20], and how
it provides a novel interpretation for quantum advantage
in biased nonlocal games [21]. I conclude in Section VI
with a summary of the results, and a discussion of its
relevance, drawbacks and directions for further research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Causal models
A modern framework for causation and its role in
explaining correlations can be found in the theory of
causal networks [11]. With extensive applicability from
statistics to epidemiology, economics, and artificial in-
telligence, it has been developed as a tool to connect
causal inferences and probabilistic observations. In such
a model, causal structure is represented as a graph G,
with variables as nodes and direct causal links as directed
edges (arrows) between nodes. To avoid the potential for
paradoxical causal loops, closed cycles are forbidden, and
the resulting structure is a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
(Fig. 1). The relations between nodes in a DAG G can be
expressed in an intuitive genealogical terminology: nodes
pointing to a given node X (the direct causes of X) are
called the parents of X, denoted as Pa(X); the ancestors
of X, An(X), are all nodes from which there is a directed
path to X (i.e. all variables in the causal past of X); the
descendants of X, De(X), are all nodes for which X is
an ancestor (i.e. all variables in the causal future of X);
the set of non-descendants of X is denoted by Nd(X).
The purpose of a DAG is to encode the conditional
independences associated with any probability distribu-
tion compatible with the causal structure, through the
Causal Markov Condition: in any probability distribu-
tion P that is compatible with a graph G, a variable X is
independent of all its non-descendants, conditional on its
parents. That is, P (X|Nd(X), Pa(X)) = P (X|Pa(X),
which we denote as (X ⊥ Nd(X)|Pa(X)). The Causal
Markov Condition is equivalent to the requirement that
any distribution over the variables X1, ..., Xn compatible
with the graph G factorises as
P (X1, ..., Xn) =
∏
j
P (Xj |Pa(Xj)) . (1)
Those conditional independences can be obtained from
the graph through a rule called d-separation [11]. Two
sets of variables X and Y are d-separated given a set
of variables Z (denoted (X ⊥ Y |Z)d) if and only if Z
“blocks” all paths p from X to Y . A path p is blocked
by Z if and only if (i) it contains a chain A → B → C
or a fork A ← B → C such that the middle node B is
in Z, or (ii) it contains an inverted fork (head-to-head)
A→ B ← C such that the node B is not in Z, and there
is no directed path from B to any member of Z.
D-separation is a sound and complete criterion for con-
ditional independence: if in a DAG G two variables X
and Y are d-separated given Z, (X ⊥ Y |Z)d, then they
are conditionally independent given Z, (X ⊥ Y |Z), in
all distributions compatible with G; and if for all distri-
butions compatible with G, the conditional independence
(X ⊥ Y |Z) holds, then G satisfies (X ⊥ Y |Z)d.
B. Causal models and Bell’s theorem
As an example of the application of this framework, we
review how it can be used to derive Bell’s theorem. Con-
sider the correlations between measurements performed
by two agents, Alice and Bob. Alice’s choice of measure-
ment is represented by a variable X, and Bob’s by a vari-
able Y . Their respective outcomes are represented by A
andB. Their measurements are assumed to be performed
within space-like separated regions, so that no relativis-
tic causal connection can exist between the variables in
Alice’s lab and those in Bob’s lab. They may however be
correlated due to variables in their common causal past,
the set of which is denoted by Λ. The assumption that
Alice and Bob can make “free choices” is translated as the
requirement that X and Y are exogenous variables: they
have no relevant causes. This scenario is represented in
the graphical notation as in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: DAG representing the causal structure of a Bell
scenario.
The Causal Markov Condition then implies that
P (ABΛ|XY ) = P (A|XΛ)P (B|Y Λ)P (Λ). Averaging
over Λ we obtain the factorisability condition of a local
hidden variable model:
P (AB|XY ) =
∑
Λ
P (Λ)P (A|XΛ)P (B|Y Λ) . (2)
As is well known, this leads to the Bell inequali-
ties, which can be violated by quantum correlations [22].
Therefore, assuming relativistic causal structure and free
choices, quantum correlations cannot be reproduced by
the classical framework of causality.
Note that the assumption of “free choice” is not strictly
necessary: a weaker but sufficient condition is simply “Λ-
3independence”, that the measurement choices are inde-
pendent of any latent variables Λ that are causally con-
nected with the systems, (Λ ⊥ XY ). This would still
be compatible with a causal graph where there is a com-
mon cause between the measurement choices X and Y .
But without one of these assumptions, it would be pos-
sible for a conspiratorial “superdeterministic” theory to
reproduce the quantum correlations. Remarkably, in the
main result of this paper neither of these assumptions
is needed. Superdeterministic theories, for example, are
ruled out because they violate no-fine-tuning.
III. CONTEXTUALITY SCENARIOS AND
CAUSAL MODELS
A. Basic definitions
Traditionally, locality and noncontextuality have been
spelled out in terms of ontological models, but here I
translate those concepts into the language of causal mod-
els. Indeed, we can think of ontological models as causal
models in disguise, which is an useful perspective as it al-
lows one to more clearly identify implicit classical causal
assumptions that may be revised in light of quantum
causal models. The formalism used here is most anal-
ogous to that of Abramsky and Brandenburger [4], al-
though it is expressed in the language of causal models,
and uses simplified terminology (for example, without
reference to sheaf theory).
A measurement scenario is specified by: i) A setM of
measurements; ii) for each measurement m ∈M, a set of
possible outcomes Om; and iii) a compatibility structure
C on M – a family of subsets of M – specifying joint
measurability. Two measurements m1,m2 ∈ M are said
to be jointly measurable, compatible, or to be part of a
context, iff {m1,m2} ∈ C, and likewise for sets of more
than two measurements [23]. Without loss of generality,
we can enlarge each Om so that all measurements have
the same number of outcomes, and label them so that all
outcome sets are equal and denoted simply by O.
Consider now an individual test within a measurement
scenario, where a set of n random variables X1, ..., Xn
specifies n measurements to be performed upon the sys-
tem. A compatibility scenario, or contextuality scenario is
one in which for any given run x1, ..., xn are jointly mea-
surable. That is, let Xi = xi ∈ M denote the values of
those variables in a particular run. Then {x1, ..., xn} ∈ C.
This could be done, for example, through a further
random variable C that selects a context, from which
X1, ..., Xn are determined, but we make no assumption
about the process of selection or the order in which the
measurements are performed. A special class of contex-
tuality scenarios is that in whichM can be decomposed
into k subsets M1,M2, ...,Mk such that all contexts
c ∈ C have at most one element from each subset. These
are called (k-partite) Bell-nonlocality scenarios.
From here on we consider scenarios containing only
pairs of compatible measurements. This doesn’t neces-
sarily mean that there are no sets of three or more com-
patible measurements that can be performed on the sys-
tem, but only that we are restricting M so that it only
contains pairs of them. These will be called binary con-
textuality scenarios, a special case of which are bipartite
Bell scenarios. The measurements will be chosen through
random variables X and Y , with outcomes respectively
recorded by random variables A and B.
A phenomenon P for such a scenario is specified by
a probability distribution P(ABXY ) for the observable
variables. Note that no causal assumption is made up to
this stage. We now define what we mean by a (classical)
causal model for a phenomenon.
Definition 1 (Causal model). A (classical) causal
model Γ for a phenomenon P consists of a (possi-
bly empty) set of latent variables Λ, a DAG G with
nodes {A,B,X, Y,Λ}, and a probability distribution
P (ABXY Λ) compatible with G, such that P(ABXY ) =∑
Λ P (ABXY Λ).
A special class of phenomena are those where the
probability for the outcome of one measurement does
not depend on which measurement it may be per-
formed together with, i.e. that satisfy the property of
no-disturbance.
Definition 2 (No-disturbance). A phenomenon is said
to satisfy no-disturbance iff P(A|XY ) = P(A|X) and
P(B|XY ) = P(B|Y ) for all values of the variables A,
B, X, Y for which those conditionals are defined.
In the causal-model notation, the no-disturbance con-
ditions are denoted by (A ⊥ Y |X) and (B ⊥ X|Y ).
Compatibility scenarios naturally satisfy those condi-
tions, since X and Y can only take joint values as pairs of
compatible measurements, and the no-disturbance condi-
tion is implicit in the very meaning of compatibility [4].
In Bell scenarios this assumption is called no-signalling,
and where the measurements X and Y are performed in
space-like separated regions, it is justified by relativity.
Whereas no-disturbance and no-signalling are purely
properties of phenomena, the subsequent definitions are
about properties of causal models for phenomena in con-
textuality scenarios. We say that a phenomenon violates
a property when no causal model for the phenomenon
satisfies that property.
Bell-locality and KS-noncontextuality are equivalent
to the existence of a factorisable hidden variable model,
which in the language of causal models translates to:
Definition 3 (Factorisability). A causal model is said
to satisfy factorisability iff ∀A,B,X, Y, P (AB|XY ) =∑
Λ P (Λ)P (A|XΛ)P (B|Y Λ).
The original Kochen-Specker theorem assumed the ex-
istence of a deterministic noncontextual model. By Fine’s
theorem [24], this is equivalent to the existence of a fac-
torisable model, and to the existence of a joint proba-
bility distribution for the outcomes of all measurements
that returns the observable correlations as marginals.
4Definition 4 (KS-noncontextuality). A causal model
for a contextuality scenario is said to satisfy KS-
noncontextuality iff it is factorisable.
From factorisability, one can derive, for each contex-
tuality scenario, inequalities that bound the set of KS-
noncontextual phenomena, as facets of a convex polytope
[25, 26]. These are the KS-inequalities [27], which reduce
to Bell inequalities in Bell scenarios.
Despite this formal equivalence. much controversy
remains regarding the justification for factorisability in
contextuality scenarios. While in Bell scenarios it is im-
plied by Bell’s notion of local causality (for a detailed
review, see [10]), this is not so in contextuality scenarios,
where measurements are not space-like separated. To de-
rive factorizability in this case, one requires, apart from
the assumption of measurement noncontextuality, an ex-
tra assumption of outcome determinism [7], calling into
question the implication of violations of Kochen-Specker
inequalities. However, as we will see below, factorisabil-
ity is implied by another fundamental principle of the
causal models framework, the principle of no-fine-tuning,
or faithfulness.
Definition 5 (Faithfulness (no fine-tuning)). A causal
model Γ is said to satisfy no fine-tuning or be faithful
relative to a phenomenon P iff every conditional inde-
pendence (C ⊥ D|E) in P corresponds to a d-separation
(C ⊥ D|E)d in the causal graph G of Γ.
For example, suppose a phenomenon satisfies the no-
disturbance condition (A ⊥ Y |X), but its causal struc-
ture contains a direct link from Y to A, and thus lacks
the d-separation (A ⊥ Y |X)d. This is only possible if
some of the parameters of the model take special val-
ues that hide the influence of Y on A. An example is
Bohmian mechanics, where the probability distributions
for the hidden variables are constrained by the “quantum
equilibrium” condition [28]. A faithful causal model, on
the other hand, has no such hidden causal connections.
No-fine-tuning can be seen therefore as an instance of
Occam’s razor [11], or of a methodological principle that
also motivates Spekkens’ notion of generalised contex-
tuality [3]: Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indis-
cernibles. It states that one should not postulate differ-
ences in the ontological (i.e., causal-model) description
of a phenomenon where none exists at the operational
level. Here, however, we show that this principle leads to
KS-noncontextuality, implying that the two competing
notions of noncontextuality have more in common than
has been previously realised. Whether Spekkens’ notion
can also be directly derived from faithfulness is an inter-
esting question left for future work.
B. Main result
Theorem 1. Every faithful causal model for a no-
disturbance phenomenon is factorisable.
As shown in detail in the Appendix, the proof of The-
orem 1 proceeds by showing that all DAGs that do not
require fine-tuning to explain the no-disturbance con-
ditions lead to factorisability. We first note that the
no-disturbance conditions, together with the assumption
of no fine-tuning, imply that every DAG G for a no-
disturbance phenomenon P must satisfy the d-separation
conditions (A ⊥ Y |X)d and (B ⊥ X|Y )d. We thus pro-
ceed by excluding every DAG that does not satisfy these
conditions, and show that all remaining DAGs imply fac-
torisability. As an immediate corollary:
Corollary 1. No fine-tuning and no-disturbance imply
KS noncontextuality.
Another corollary is a stronger version of the result of
[20], without the extra assumptions of marginal setting
independence and local setting dependence:
Corollary 2. No fine-tuning and no-signalling imply
Bell-locality.
It is instructive to state Corollary 1 in a contrapositive
form:
Corollary 3. Every classical causal model that repro-
duces the violation of a KS-inequality in a no-disturbance
phenomenon requires fine-tuning.
This result implies that the quantum violation of clas-
sical causality, long recognised in the case of space-like
separated entangled quantum systems, also manifests in
the case of single systems.
IV. EXAMPLES
To illustrate the need for fine-tuning in causal ex-
planations of KS-inequality violations, let us consider
as a simple example the three-observable scenario in-
troduced Liang, Wiseman and Spekkens (LSW) in [29].
The measurement scenario consists of a set of three
measurements M = {m1,m2,m3} with binary out-
comes O = {0, 1} and compatibility structure C =
{{m1,m2}, {m1,m3}, {m2,m3}} – that is, they are pair-
wise compatible but not triplewise compatible. In any
given experimental test, X and Y can take any pair
of values from C and A and B can take values from
O = {0, 1}. Consider a phenomenon P(ABXY ) that sat-
isfies the no-disturbance relations P(A|XY ) = P(A|X)
and P(B|XY ) = P(B|Y ). Thus from Theorem 1 any
faithful causal model for this phenomenon must satisfy
KS-noncontextuality.
KS-noncontextuality in this scenario implies the LSW
inequality [29]:∑
{mi,mj}∈C
1
3
P(A 6= B|mi,mj) ≤ 2
3
. (3)
To see this, recall that the existence of a KS-
noncontextual model is equivalent to the existence of a
5joint probability distribution for the outcomes of all mea-
surements. For each extreme point of this distribution, at
most two of the three pairs of measurements can be anti-
correlated, so the average probability of anti-correlation
cannot exceed 2/3. (Note that since (X,Y ) = (m1,m2)
and (X,Y ) = (m2,m1) correspond to the same pair of
measurements being performed, P(A = k,B = l|X =
mi, Y = mj) = P(A = l, B = k|X = mj , Y = mi)).
The authors of [29] illustrate a hypothetical maximal
violation of (3) as a realisation of the “parable of the
overprotective seer” (OS): wishing to ward off unworthy
suitors for his beloved daughter, a seer from ancient As-
syria proposed to each of them the following task. They
were taken to a table upon which sat three boxes, and
asked to open two of the boxes. If both boxes were to
contain a gem, or both boxes were to not contain a gem,
they would win the task and would be allowed to marry
the seer’s daughter. As it turned out, every suitor always
randomly found a gem in one box and none in the other
– a seemingly paradoxical situation!
An example of a causal model that realises the OS
correlations consists of the causal graph in Figure 3 and
the following causal parameters. A uniformly distributed
latent variable Λ determines for each box whether or not
it contains a gem. Let X denote the first box opened by
the suitor, so A(X,Λ) ∈ {0, 1} for any value of X, with
A = 1 representing the presence of a gem. Depending
on whether or not the first box contained a gem, a gem
is added or removed from the second box Y , to ensure
that B(X,Y,Λ) = A(X,Λ) ⊕ 1 for all {X,Y } ∈ C. To
see the need for fine-tuning, note that if one were able
to prepare any distribution for the hidden variables, no-
disturbance would be violated. For example, suppose one
could prepare Λ = Λ0 such that A(X = mi,Λ0) = δi,1.
If Y = m3 is measured, its outcome will be B = 0 if
X = m1 and B = 1 if X = m2. Of course, the need
for fine-tuning would manifest in different ways for other
causal models but Theorem 1 guarantees that any causal
model for these correlations requires fine-tuning.
A B

YX
Fig. 3: Example of a causal structure that can reproduce
violations of KS-inequalities with fine-tuning.
Although the LSW inequality does not have a quan-
tum violation for projective measurements, a very sim-
ilar analysis would hold for the slightly more complex
scenario of Klyachko et al. [30], involving five observ-
ables with binary outcomes, and cyclical compatibility
structure. We leave this as an exercise for the reader.
V. RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK
The present work was inspired by [20], however, there
are some important differences. In [20], it was shown that
any causal model for a Bell scenario that satisfies the as-
sumptions of no-signalling and no-fine-tuning, plus two
extra assumptions of marginal setting independence and
local setting dependence, is factorisable. As the present
derivation does not make those extra assumptions, it gen-
eralises the result of [20] already for Bell scenarios.
Local setting dependence is the assumption that the lo-
cal outcome is not independent of the local setting, i.e.,
that it is not the case that (A ⊥ X) or (B ⊥ Y ). This as-
sumption rules out standard examples of Bell-inequality
violation with unbiased outcomes. Marginal setting in-
dependence is the assumption that the settings X and
Y are uncorrelated, (X ⊥ Y ). While in [20] the no-
signalling condition is justified by space-like separation,
here the more general ‘no-disturbance’ is implied by mea-
surement compatibility. In Bell scenarios, the compati-
bility of X and Y is guaranteed because they are chosen
from disjoint sets of measurementsMA andMB , but in
general contextuality scenarios X and Y are chosen from
the same set M, and are not in general independent.
Thus the result of [20] cannot be applied to contextual-
ity scenarios.
Note that the Bell inequalities implied by the present
result are the usual constraints on conditional probabili-
ties P(AB|XY ). In some contexts, such as that of biased
nonlocal games [21], one may be interested in constraints
on the unconditional P(ABXY ). The class of classical
models considered in that paper is one where the usual
constraints on conditional probabilities apply, but where
the joint probabilities for X and Y are allowed to be ar-
bitrary. Therefore P(ABXY ) = P(XY )P(AB|XY ) =
P (XY )
∑
Λ P (Λ)P (A|XΛ)P (B|Y Λ). It was shown in
[21] that quantum correlations can violate inequalities
implied by this model for some values of P(XY ), even
in cases where the conditional probabilities do not vio-
late a Bell inequality. Since here we make no assumption
about the joint probabilities P(XY ), the set of classical
models above can also be derived from the assumption of
no-fine-tuning, and therefore classical causal models that
reproduce the quantum violations of those constraints
also require fine-tuning – even when they do not allow
for the violation of a Bell inequality.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have derived KS-inequalities as a con-
sequence of the principle of no-fine-tuning for causal
models of phenomena that satisfy the no-disturbance
conditions. This result unifies Bell nonlocality (where
‘no-disturbance’ corresponds to ‘no-signalling’) and KS-
contextuality as violations of classical causality. Re-
markably, unlike all other derivations of Bell inequali-
ties, this result needs no assumption related to indepen-
6dence of settings, such as ‘free choice’, ‘Λ-independence’,
or ‘marginal setting independence’.
One could object that to achieve the no-disturbance
conditions in general contextuality scenarios, one requires
perfectly compatible measurements, and that this ideal-
isation makes it inapplicable to real experimental tests.
This is true, but it is no worse than the problem faced
by all standard derivations of KS-inequalities, as dis-
cussed in [7], where the assumption of outcome deter-
minism is incompatible with realistic unsharp measure-
ments. The advantage of the present work is that, at least
for idealised phenomena, it allows the derivation of KS-
inequalities from causality principles alone, without the
extra assumption of outcome determinism. Thus it al-
lows for the conclusion that those causal principles must
be revised in light of the (idealised) predictions of quan-
tum theory, whereas no such conclusion can be reached
with the usual derivation, even in the idealised case.
Furthermore, the present derivation suggests a path
for an experimentally robust generalisation. Given a
measure of causal connection [31, 32], we can propose
a generalised principle of no-fine-tuning : a causal model
should not allow causal connections stronger than needed
to explain the observed deviations from no-disturbance.
It would be interesting to determine whether testable
constraints can be derived this way. Another interest-
ing question is whether the proof can be extended to
arbitrary numbers of measurements per context.
From the point of view of applications, we may under-
stand fine-tuning as a kind of “resource waste”, postu-
lating causal links that are not directly observed in the
phenomena, but are washed-out by our ignorance of un-
derlying parameters. It is plausible to conjecture that
quantum causal models [14–18], on the other hand, can
avoid fine-tuning in explaining quantum correlations. If
we think of classical causal models as classical simulations
of quantum phenomena, the present result implies that
they must necessarily waste resources via fine-tuning. A
quantification of this intuition could potentially provide
a novel picture to explain the power of contextuality as
a resource for quantum computation.
Finally, it would be interesting to determine whether
the generalised notions of noncontextuality given by the
formalism of Spekkens [3] can also be understood as aris-
ing from no-fine-tuning.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove by exhaustion that all DAGs that do
not require fine-tuning to explain the no-disturbance
conditions lead to factorisability, and thereby to KS-
noncontextuality.
First note that the no-disturbance conditions, together
with the assumption of no fine-tuning, imply that ev-
ery DAG G for a no-disturbance phenomenon P must
satisfy the d-separation conditions (A ⊥ Y |X)d and
(B ⊥ X|Y )d. We thus proceed by excluding every DAG
that does not satisfy these conditions, and showing that
all remaining DAGs imply factorisability.
The class of DAGs we need to consider are those that
include latent variables as common causes for observable
variables, or direct causal connections between variables.
There is no point considering latent variables as interme-
diaries between variables, or as common effects of vari-
ables, since adding those has no effect on the allowed
probability distributions over the observable variables.
To aid the proofs, we introduce the graphical notation
in Figs. 4-7 to represent sets of causal connections.

X Y
X Y ≡

X Y
X Y ≡
Fig. 4: Shortcut graphical notations for causal connections
between X and Y .
8X Y
X Y
X Y
≡ or
Fig. 5: Shortcut graphical notation for a direct cause from
X to Y with or without a common cause.
X Y
X Y
X Y
≡ or
Fig. 6: Shortcut graphical notation for any causal link with
no direct cause from Y to X.
X Y
X Y
X Y
≡ or
Fig. 7: Shortcut graphical notation for any causal link
between X and Y .
As a reminder, the d-separation condition (A ⊥ Y |X)d
means that X “blocks” all paths p from A to Y . A path
is blocked by X if and only if (i) it contains a chain or
a fork with X in the middle node, or (ii) it contains an
inverted fork such that X is not the middle node nor a
descendant of it. The intuition behind these rules is that
in case (i), X is a common cause or an intermediate cause
between its adjacent variables, and thus conditioning on
X eliminates the correlations established by this causal
path, thus “blocking” it. In case (ii), X is a common
effect of its adjacent variables, and thus conditioning on
X can render them correlated. From this d-separation
condition therefore we eliminate all graphs that contain
one or more paths between A and Y that are not blocked
by X, and likewise for (B ⊥ X|Y )d.
Step 1: From the d-separation condition (A ⊥ Y |X)d,
we can exclude any direct causal link or common cause
between A and Y (i.e. all edges of the kind shown in
Fig. 7). Likewise from (B ⊥ X|Y )d, we can exclude
any direct causal link or common cause between B and
X. Taken together, these exclude common causes be-
tween any three or all four of the variables. We are left
with the possibility of any causal links between the pairs
{A,B}, {X,A}, {Y,B} and {X,Y }, as shown on Fig. 8.
Note that we do not assume a priori that common causes
can only act between at most two variables – this is a
consequence of no-fine-tuning.
Step 2a: Next, we exclude a direct causal link from
A to B (with or without a common cause between those
two variables). First, note that the assumption of such a
X Y
A B
Fig. 8: Remaining class of DAGs after step 1. Dashed lines
represent a connection of the type indicated or its absence.
link excludes any causal link between A and X, as those
would violate (B ⊥ X|Y )d, and a direct link from B to
Y , as this would violate (A ⊥ Y |X)d. The remaining
class of graphs compatible with a direct link from A to
B can now have any connection between X and Y plus
any link with no direct cause from B to Y (Fig. 9).
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
(B⫫X|Y)d (A⫫Y|X)d
Fig. 9: DAG elimination from d-separation in step 2a. The
diagrams in this and the following figures should be read as
follows. Each graph represents the set of all DAGs that
contain only causal connections compatible with each
shortcut notation. Solid lines require a compatible causal
connection, and dashed lines are compatible with no
connection. On each arrow between graphs, we eliminate all
graphs that are incompatible with the d-separation
condition indicated.
Step 2b: We now exclude a common cause between B
and Y acting together with a direct link from X to Y
and/or a common cause between X and Y ; those graphs
would violate (B ⊥ X|Y )d as they are colliders. There
are now two classes of graphs compatible with a direct
link between A and B: i) any link between X and Y and
a direct link from Y to B; or ii) a direct link from Y to X
plus any link with no direct cause from B to Y .(Fig. 10).
(B⫫X|Y)d
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
or
X Y
A B
Fig. 10: DAG elimination from d-separation in step 2b.
Step 2c: We proceed to show that all phenomena
compatible with the two classes of graphs remaining
after Step 2b are factorisable. To see this, first note
that both classes of graphs i) and ii) above respect the
following d-separation conditions: (AB ⊥ X|Y )d and
(A ⊥ Y )d. This means that all distributions compatible
with those graphs must respect P (AB|XY ) = P (AB|Y )
9and P (A|Y ) = P (A). The first conditional independence
implies that the joint distribution of A and B doesn’t de-
pend on the choice of measurement X, which intuitively
should imply that this phenomenon cannot be contex-
tual. To see this formally, note that from the definition of
conditional probability and the two equations above we
get P (AB|XY ) = P (B|AY )P (A|Y ) = P (B|AY )P (A).
Now let Λ be a variable that determines A, so that
P (A) =
∑
Λ P (Λ)P (A|Λ) and P (B|AY ) = P (B|Y Λ).
Then P (AB|XY ) =∑Λ P (Λ)P (A|Λ)P (B|Y Λ), which is
a factorisable model with no dependence on X.
This concludes the part of the proof excluding a direct
causal link from A to B. By symmetry we exclude any
direct causal link from B to A. The remaining class of
graphs now can have a common cause between A and
B and any causal link between the pairs {X,A}, {Y,B}
and {X,Y } (Fig. 11).
X Y
A B
Fig. 11: Remaining class of DAGs after step 2.
Step 3: We now proceed to exclude, from the remain-
ing graphs, any direct cause from A to X (a retrocausal
model). First we see that, assuming such link, a common
cause between A and B is excluded from (B ⊥ X|Y )d.
Next, any link between X and Y except X → Y is ex-
cluded from (A ⊥ Y |X)d. Finally, any link between Y
and B except Y → B is excluded by (B ⊥ X|Y )d.
The remaining graph has four possible links: a com-
mon cause between A and X, A → X, X → Y and
Y → B. This implies that (B ⊥ AX|Y ) and (A ⊥
Y |X). Thus P (AB|XY ) = P (B|AXY )P (A|XY ) =
P (A|X)P (B|Y ), which is trivially factorisable. By sym-
metry, we eliminate any direct cause from B to Y .
X Y
A B
(B⫫X|Y)d
(B⫫X|Y)d
X Y
A B
(A⫫Y|X)d
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
factorisable
Fig. 12: Elimination of DAGs in step 3.
Step 4: After step 3 we are left with the following class
of graphs (Fig. 13): a possible common cause (let’s call
it Λ) between A and B, any link between X and Y , no
direct cause A→ X and no direct cause B → Y .
X Y
A B
Fig. 13: Remaining class of DAGs after step 3.
In the next step we exclude, from (A ⊥ Y |X)d, any
common cause A ↔ X acting together with X ↔ Y
and/or X ← Y . Likewise from (B ⊥ X|Y )d, we exclude
any common cause B ↔ Y acting together with X ↔ Y
and/or X → Y .
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
(A⫫Y|X)d
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
X Y
A B
(B⫫X|Y)d (B⫫X|Y)d
Fig. 14: DAG elimination in step 4. In step 5 we show that
the three remaining classes of DAGs are factorisable.
Step 5: We are finally left with three remaining classes
of graphs. All three classes allow for A ↔ B, X → A
and Y → B, and respectively i) X ↔ A, X → Y ; ii)
Y ↔ B X ← Y ; and iii) any link between X and Y . All
of these have Λ as a free variable and imply the condi-
tional independences (A ⊥ BY |XΛ) and (B ⊥ AX|Y Λ).
So P (AB|XY ) = ∑Λ P (Λ)P (A|BXY Λ)P (B|XY Λ) =∑
Λ P (Λ)P (A|XΛ)P (B|Y Λ), which is of factorisable
form. This completes the proof.
